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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article Aquinas‟s three accounts of how the elements combine – those of Avicenna, Averroës and 
Aquinas himself – are considered. An attempt is then made to reinterpret these accounts in the light of our 
contemporary understanding of the manner in which the modern elements behave in combination. This 
follows Bobik‟s lead in restating Aquinas‟s own account of how the Aristotelian elements combine, using 
present-day insights into the behaviour of the modern elements. 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
I 
Introduction 
 
De Mixtione Elementorum is a short work by St Thomas Aquinas.  McDermott1 states that 
its date of composition is uncertain, Bobik2 gives 1273, and Larkin3 quotes Mandonnet as 
giving it at about 1273, and Eschmann as 1270/71.  Larkin goes on to say that in this 
work Aquinas takes up the problem of Aristotle‟s De Generatione et Corruptione, book 1, 
chapter 10, and considers two viewpoints on the question of how the forms of the 
elements remain in compounds.  The first position he takes up, according to Larkin4 is 
that these forms persist actually in the compound.  After refuting it, he presents an 
opinion that tries to avoid the difficulties inherent in the preceding position, and those 
also that are entailed in the contention that the forms of the elements do not exist in the 
compound at all.  Aquinas rejects this second opinion also and then reaffirms the 
Aristotelian solution. 
 McDermott5 says that the philosophical questions asked by Aquinas would still 
have to be asked today by an Aristotelian philosophy of substance: in a compound what 
is the substance, only the elements, or both the elements and the compound, or only the 
compound?  It is the intention of this essay to give an account of both De Mixtione 
Elementorum itself and of Grant‟s commentary on it, and to discuss Bobik‟s interpretation 
of the work. 
 
II 
De Mixtione Elementorum 
 
2.1 Avicenna’s Theory 
The substantial forms remain, but active and passive qualities of the elements are 
somehow placed, by being altered, in an intermediate state, the reason being that if they 
did not remain, there would be a kind of corruption of the elements, rather than a 
combination.  As Grant6 says this topic was discussed by Avicenna in his Sufficientia.  
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According to Grant, Avicenna argued that the substantial or essential forms of the 
combining elements persist, unaltered, in a compound.  With only their qualities altering 
and weakening, contrary qualities blend into a complexio, or mean quality.  But the new 
complexions, or mean qualities, do not produce a new substantial form in the newly 
forming compound.  Rather, they prepare the matter of the compound to receive a new 
substantial form that is infused directly by the „dator formarum‟, namely the agent intellect.  
This new substantial form is simply added to the four substantial forms of the elements 
already present in the compound.  The properties or accidents of the compound are then 
finally determined by the new substantial form.  Grant goes on to say that Avicenna‟s 
theory was almost without influence in the Latin west. 
 Aquinas7 continues that if the substantial form of the compound is the act of 
matter, without presupposing the forms of the simple bodies, then the simple bodies 
would lose the nature of the elements, for an element is that out of which something is in 
the first instance formed, which remains in it, and which is by its nature indivisible, for if 
the substantial forms are withdrawn, the compound will not be formed from the 
elements in such a way that they remain in it.  [This argument is drawn from Aristotle‟s 
Metaphysics, according to Grant,8 who gives Aristotle‟s definition of an element as: „the 
primary component immanent in a thing, and indivisible in kind into other kinds‟  (Meta. 
V. 3. 1014a 26-27).].  Aquinas9 says that this cannot be the case, in that it is impossible 
for the same portion of matter to receive the forms of the different elements.  He argues 
that if the substantial forms of the elements are preserved in the compound they must be 
in different parts of matter.  But it is impossible for different parts of matter to receive 
them, unless it is assumed that quality is present in matter, for if quality is not 
presupposed, the substance would still be indivisible, as is made clear in the first book of 
the Physics, which Grant10 gives as: 
„If, then, being is both substance and quality, it is two, not one: if only substance, 
it is not infinite and has no magnitude; for to have that it will have to be a 
quality‟. 
 
(Physics, 1.2. 185b. 2-4) 
 
Thus, according to Grant, if being is substance only, it will have no magnitude and will 
consequently be indivisible. 
 Aquinas11 continues that a physical body is composed of matter that is subject to 
dimensions, and of a substantial form united to it, and therefore the different parts of the 
matter, that support the forms of the elements, receive the natures of several bodies.  But 
he says: „multa autem corpora impossibile est esse simul‟.  The four elements will not then be in 
each part of the mixture, and hence there will not be a true mixture, but only an apparent 
one, as is the case when bodies, which are invisible or imperceptible due to their 
minuteness, are clustered together.  Grant 12  explains that under the circumstances 
described here, if four elements constitute a given compound, each element will fully 
retain its identity and represent a part of the compound in complete isolation from the 
other three elements.  Thus a compound would consist of four elements each occupying 
a different part of the compound, but unmixed in any matter.  Hence it is not a true 
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12 Ibid., p. 604. 
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mixture or compound.  Grant13 goes on to explain that in De Generatione et Corruptione 
book 1, chapter 10, Aristotle has distinguished between what the scholastics were to call 
a mixtio ad sensum, which corresponds to a physical mixture, and a mixtio secundum veritatem, 
which corresponds more closely to our notion of a chemical compound.  Grant goes on 
to say that how elements were contained in a compound was answered by Aristotle only 
very briefly and sketchily, and explained that: „since, however, some things are-potentially 
while others are-actually the constituents, combined in a compound can „be‟ in a sense and 
yet „not-be‟.‟  The compound may be-actually other than the constituents from which it 
has resulted, nevertheless each of them may still be-potentially what it was before they were 
combined, and both of them may survive undestroyed.  The constituents, therefore, 
neither: 
 
a. persist actually, as „body‟ and „white‟ persist, nor 
b. are they destroyed (either one of them or both) for their „power of action‟ is 
preserved  (De Generatione et Corruptione 1.10. 327b. 24-31). 
 
Grant14 says that it was left to the scholastics to explain the mechanism by means of 
which an element could be said to have its power preserved in a compound and yet not 
actually persist.  A number of solutions were proposed, the most important of which are 
discussed by Aquinas in the work under consideration. 
 Aquinas15 continues that every substantial form demands a special disposition 
(propriam dispositionem) in matter, without which it cannot exist, as a result, alteration 
precedes generation and corruption.  He states that it is impossible that the special 
disposition which is demanded by the form of water should be found in the same 
portion of matter, because it is on account of such dispositions that fire and water are 
contraries.  It is impossible for contraries to be entirely present in the same thing at the 
same time, he argues, and therefore it is impossible for the substantial forms of fire and 
water to be in the same part of a compound (in eadem parte mixti).  If then a compound is 
formed while the substantial forms of the elements remain, it follows that it is not a true 
compound, but only an apparent one, as when parts, indiscernible because of their 
smallness, are placed next to one another. 
 
2.2 Averroës’s Theory 
Aquinas16 then says that some men wishing to escape both arguments, have fallen into a 
greater difficulty, and goes on to give Averroës‟s account.  In order to distinguish the 
combinations of elements from their corruption, they said the substantial forms of the 
elements indeed remain somehow in the compound, but lest they should be forced to 
admit that it is an apparent combination, and not a true one, they maintain that the forms 
of the elements do not remain in the compound in their entirely, but are reduced to some 
intermediary state, for they say that the forms of the elements admit of more or less, and 
are related to one another as contraries.  But because this plainly contradicts the common 
opinion of men and of Aristotle in his Praedicamenta [According to Grant17 the Categories, 
5.3b. 24) „another characteristic of substances is that there is nothing contrary to them‟, 
and 5.3b. 33: „For example, white, which is in a subject (the body), is predicated of the 
subject; for a body is called white.  But the definition will never be predicated of the 
body‟] that substance has no contrary and that it does not admit of more or less, they go 
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further, and say that the forms of the elements are the least perfect of all (imperfectissimae) 
as they are closer than others to prime matter, hence they stand midway between 
substantial and accidental forms (mediae inter formas substantiales et accidentals), and thus, 
inasmuch as they approximate the nature of accidental forms, they can admit of more or 
less, even though they are related to one another as contraries.  But Aquinas dismisses 
this position for a number of reasons.  First, because it is impossible for something to 
stand midway between substance and accident, as then there would be a mean between 
affirmation and negation.  It is in the nature of the accident that it be in a subject, but in 
the nature of substance that it not be in a subject.  And substantial forms are indeed in 
matter (materia) but not in a subject, for a subject is something individual.  A substantial 
form is that which causes the individual subject.  It does not presuppose it. Likewise, it is 
ridiculous to say that there is something midway between things which do not belong to 
the same genus, for the means and the extremes must belong to the same genus, as 
proved in Book 10 of Aristotle‟s Metaphysics, in which he says: „for all intermediates are in 
the same genus as the things between which they stand‟.  Therefore there can be no 
mean between substance and accident. 
 Aquinas18 gives another example in which he states that it is impossible for the 
substantial form of the element to admit of more or less.  He elaborates on this by saying 
that every form that admits of more or less is accidentally divisible inasmuch as the 
subject can participate in it more or less.  Now, he says, one finds continuous motion in 
that which is divisible essentially or accidentally, as is made clear in Aristotle‟s Physics, 
which Grant19 gives as Physics VI.2. 233b. 15, 31 in which Aristotle says: „… neither a line 
nor a surface nor in fact, anything continuous, can be indivisible‟ and „it is evident, 
therefore, that nothing continuous is without parts‟, respectively. 
 Aquinas says that one has as examples change of place, and growth and decay 
with respect to space and quality which are essentially divisible, and alteration with 
respect to qualities, such as hot and white, that admit or more or less, there will be 
continuous motion in both the generation and corruption of the elements, but that this is 
impossible, for continuous motion exists in three genera, namely quantity, quality and 
place, as is proved in Aristotle‟s Physics Book 5, given by Grant as Physics V.1. 225b. 9, in 
which Aristotle says „There are three kinds of motion – qualitative, quantitative and 
local‟. 
 Furthermore, even difference in substantial form results in a change of species, 
and what admits of more or less, and is in some way contrary to it, as in the case of the 
more white and the less white.  If then the substantial form of fire admits of more or 
less, it will result in a change of species, according as it is more or less realised, and it will 
not be the same form but another one.  Aquinas20 then quotes Aristotle in the eighth 
book of the Metaphysics, that just as the species is changed in the case of numbers by 
addition and subtraction, so also is it changed in the case of substances.  He concludes 
that some other explanation must be found by which the truth that a combination is 
effected and that the elements are not wholly destroyed but remain in some way in the 
compound may be safeguarded.  He then goes on to state his own solution to the 
problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 604. 
19 Ibid., p. 604. 
20 Ibid., p. 605. 
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2.3 Aquinas’s own Theory 
Aquinas21 first considers that the active and passive qualities of the elements are related 
to one another as contraries, and admit of more or less.  From these contrary qualities 
there can be formed a mediant quality which partakes of the nature of each extreme, and 
he gives as examples grey which lies between white and black and warm which lies 
between hot and cold.  Thus, when the perfections of the qualities of the elements are 
modified, there is formed from them some kind of mediant quality which is the quality 
characteristic of the compound and which differs in different compounds according to 
the different proportions of the combinations, and the quality is, in fact, the disposition 
that belongs to the form of the compound, just as the elementary quality is the 
disposition that belongs to the form of an element.  He argues that the quality of an 
element is indeed distinct from its substantial form.  However, it acts by virtue of the 
substantial form, otherwise, heat would merely warm, and not by its power would a 
substantial form be brought to actual existence, for a thing‟s activity cannot transcend its 
nature. 
 Aquinas22 argues that in this way the powers of the substantial forms of the 
elements are retained in compounds.  As Grant23 explains, that is, through the elemental 
qualities which united to form the mediant quality, which becomes the characteristic 
quality of the compound.  Aquinas concludes that the forms of the elements are present 
in compounds not actually but virtually, and that this is what Aristotle says in the first 
book of De Generatione et Corruptione, given by Grant24 as 1.10. 327b. 30-32. 
„The elements do not remain actually in the compound, as body and white do, 
and neither one of them nor both of them are destroyed or altered; for their 
power is preserved.‟ 
 
III 
Discussion 
 
3.1 Avicenna’s Theory 
In Bobik‟s25 analysis of this theory the elements remain with their substantial forms, but 
their active and passive forms have been changed into some sort of mean.  He says that 
Aquinas points out that the active and passive qualities of a mixed body are different 
from, and are some sort of mean between, those of each of its constituent elements, for 
if they were not different, it would be impossible to differentiate the mixed body from its 
elements.  For a thing acts, and is itself acted upon, according to what it is.  But the 
elements themselves, in a mixed body, must remain unchanged, must retain their 
substantial forms.  Because, if this were not the case, the elements would have been 
corrupted and, just as it is impossible for a whole to be made up of constituents which 
no longer exist, so too is it impossible to have a mixing of elements out of elements 
which no longer exist. 
 
Bobik26 says that they (the Avicenneans) argue secondly, as Aquinas notes, that if the 
substantial form of a mixed body were to inform prime matter directly, so that the forms 
of the now-constituting simple bodies had perished, then the simple bodies would not 
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fulfil the definition of an element.  For, whatever else an element is, it is something 
which remains in a mixed body. 
 Both of these argument, Bobik27 says, begins by supposing that the substantial 
forms of the simple bodies do not survive in the mixed body.  But, whereas the first 
argument notes that, in that case, there would not be a mixing of simple bodies, but a 
corruption of them, the second argument notes that, if that were the case, the simple 
bodies could not be elements, because they would not remain in the mixed body.  To 
have a mixing out of simple bodies, urges the first argument, one must have the simple 
bodies, but the second argument insists that for the simple bodies to be elements, they 
must remain in the mixed body as its ingredients. 
 Bobik28 employs Aquinas‟s reasoning to consider the matter in a contemporary 
context, and considers the case of water, taking water as a mixed body, and oxygen and 
hydrogen as it elements.  Do oxygen and hydrogen „remain intact‟ in water?  It seem that 
they do, in some way at least, for they can be retrieved.  Bobik29 ponders whether their 
active and passive qualities have been altered, or changed into some sort of mean.  And 
indeed, what are the active and passive qualities of hydrogen and oxygen, i.e. before they 
become constituents of water?  What is the mean, i.e. what are the active and passive 
qualities of water, in terms of which water is to be differentiated from oxygen and 
hydrogen?  And what is it that oxygen does to hydrogen, and vice versa, to produce this 
mean quality (or qualities) which is the mean quality (or qualities) proper to water? 
 Bobik30 argues that, if the substantial forms of hydrogen and oxygen remained in 
water, then water would be water throughout, yet simultaneously hydrogen in certain of 
its parts, and oxygen in certain other of its parts, which is quite clearly impossible, he 
says.  It must be the case then that, when hydrogen and oxygen become constituents of 
water, they cease being hydrogen and oxygen respectively, because water is water, and 
just water.  Nonetheless, both oxygen and hydrogen must remain in some way in the 
water.  For both are retrievable.  But how exactly do they remain?  Whatever the way in 
which they remain, they cannot remain precisely as hydrogen and oxygen, each with its 
appropriate substantial form.  Could it be that they remain by reason of their active and 
passive qualities, but as altered somehow into some sort of mean qualities, which are the 
qualities appropriate to water?   
 Bobik31 examines the difference between a true mixing (vera mixtio) and a mixing 
only to sense (mixtio ad sensum, secundum sensum, solum).  He asks whether Aquinas is 
suggesting, by implication at least, that in a true mixing the four elements (or however 
many of them are required by the substantial form of the mixed body) are found in any 
and every part (in qualibet parte) of the mixed body.  For he writes:  
„Non igitur in qualibet parte corporis mixti erunt quatuor elementa.  Et sic non erit vera, 
mixtio, sed secundum sensum …‟ 
If this is indeed what Aquinas is suggesting, then it is clear that the elements cannot be in 
the mixed body with their respective substantial forms.  For a mixed body is just 
whatever it is, and throughout.  It is certainly true, Bobik32 argues, that water (taking 
water as a mixed body) is water throughout, that every part of water is just water, and 
that no part of water is either hydrogen or oxygen (taking these as the constituting 
elements).  And this clearly implies that, however it is that the elements survive in a 
mixed body, they cannot survive with their respective substantial forms.  In a mixing 
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which is a mixing to sense only, on the other hand, the parts which make up the resulting 
body remain, each of them, with their respective substantial forms. So that, if water were 
a mixing only to sense, some parts of the water would be oxygen, other parts would by 
hydrogen, and the water itself would not be water at all, let alone throughout.  Water 
would only be a collection of juxtaposed atoms of hydrogen and oxygen.  Furthermore, it 
would not have the qualities which we know to be proper to water.  Rather, some parts 
of it would have the qualities of hydrogen, other parts, the qualities of oxygen.  So how 
then are the elements hydrogen and oxygen present in the mixed body, water?, Bobik33 
asks.  Not actually – this is clear.  Potentially then?  This seems the correct thing to say, 
for what other alternative is there?  But what exactly does this mean?  Are we to say, as it 
seems Aquinas would (if he had taken water to be a mixed body) that what this means is 
that it is their active and passive qualities which remain but as altered into water‟s 
appropriate mean qualities by their water-constituting interaction?  And are we to take 
this to mean, as it seems Aquinas would, that the substantial form of water is both 
brought into existence, and having been brought into existence, acts through these mean 
qualities, until such time as some external agent (or agents) „re-alters‟ water‟s mean 
qualities, i.e.  nullifies the prior water-constituting interaction between oxygen and 
hydrogen, releasing thereby their extreme elemental qualities, and in turn bringing about 
their re-generation as actual, and separately existing and acting, physical entities? 
 In a true mixing thus, Bobik34 argues, the elements do not survive with their 
respective substantial forms.  What survives is their active and passive qualities, 
appropriately changed by alternation into a set of mean qualities.  These mean qualities 
serve as: 
i. the disposition by which the mixed body is brought into existence, 
ii. as that by which the mixed body acts, and 
iii. as that by the removal of which the elements are released to exist again as actual, 
separate and free physical realities. 
 
 In a mixing to sense only Bobik 35  says, the ingredients survive with their 
respective substantial forms.  Such a mixing is just a collection or gathering of juxtaposed 
things – not mixed, since they have not altered one another by some appropriate 
interaction – each of which is so small that neither they nor their juxtaposition is 
perceptible to sense, but to sense only, such a mixing may, in some cases, appear to be a 
true mixing. 
 Bobik makes a clever argument in drawing attention to the shortcomings of 
Avicenna‟s analysis of the problem of how the elements blend by using as examples 
hydrogen and oxygen and how, if these two element retain their substantial forms as 
elemental hydrogen and elemental oxygen, they will not form water.  It could be argued, 
however, on Avicenna‟s behalf, that if one were to consider some solutions of water 
soluble materials, one might see some justification for Avicenna‟s position. 
 One might take as examples the two crystalline materials, copper sulphate and 
common salt (taking these as „earth‟) which are perfectly water soluble (at least up to their 
limit of solubility).  Copper sulphate is a blue crystalline solid, which dissolves in water to 
form a blue solution.  The higher the concentration of copper sulphate the bluer the 
solution.  It could be argued that copper sulphate solutions satisfy the scholastic‟s 
criterion of a mixtio secundum veritatem as there is no doubting the completeness of the 
mixing process as the solutions are perfectly clear under every scrutiny, demonstrating 
that the copper sulphate has indeed dissolved completely in the water.  Yet the solutions 
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are both blue and aqueous, proving that they really are composed of blends of copper 
sulphate and water.  But the strength of the blue colour of a given solution is in direct 
proportion to the amount of copper sulphate in that solution, the higher the proportion 
of copper sulphate the bluer the solution.  An Avicennean might well argue that this is a 
consequence of the copper sulphate and the water each preserving its substantial form in 
the solution but blending its accidental properties with the other material.  There is no 
doubting that both water and copper sulphate are present in the solutions, and an 
obvious property of each – water-whiteness in the case of water, and blueness in the case 
of copper sulphate – are also present, but in proportion to the amount of each one.  
Reduce the amount of water and the solution is bluer, showing the greater influence of 
the copper sulphate, increase the amount of water and the colour becomes less blue (or 
more water-like).  In each case the presence of the substantial forms of the two materials 
is still evident, all of the solutions under consideration are composed of copper sulphate 
and water, but the accidental properties of each material, water-whiteness and blueness, 
vary as the relative proportions of the two materials vary.  As the concentrations of the 
water and the copper sulphate vary, their accidental properties also vary.  The colour of a 
given solution is simply an averaging out of the colours of the two materials from which 
the solution is made.  An Avicennean might argue that the two elements, water and 
„earth‟ (copper sulphate) retain their substantial forms in solution, but that they average 
their accidental properties, in this case their colours, when they form a solution. 
 A similar case could be made in the case of solutions of common salt in water, 
only this time the solutions are colourness.  However, the presence of the salt is indicated 
by the saline taste of the solution.  Here again the Avicennean might argue that the 
accidental properties of the salt solutions, taken in this case to be represented by the 
saline taste of the solutions, are in direct proportion to the relative amounts of salt and 
water present in the solutions.  A high proportion of salt in solution gives a very saline 
taste, a low proportion of salt gives a less saline, or more aqueous taste.  An Avicennean 
might argue that the substantial forms of the two elements, water and „earth‟ (common 
salt) are retained in solution, but that their accidental properties, in this case their taste, 
are averaged out. 
 
3.2 Averroës’s Theory 
The elements remain with their substantial forms, but the substantial forms themselves 
have been changed into some sort of mean.  Bobik36 says that according to this argument 
the substantial forms do indeed survive in the mixed bodies, in some way, and for the 
same reason, i.e., in order to be able to claim that mixed bodies come into existence by a 
mixing of elements, not by a corruption of them.  But unlike those other thinkers, who 
hold that the active and passive qualities of the elements take on degrees of more and 
less, these thinkers maintain that it is the substantial forms themselves of the elements 
that take on degrees of more and less, and they do this in order to avoid having to say 
that the mixing is a mixing only to sense.  The mixing, they say, is a true mixing, because 
the substantial forms of the elements survive, though not in their fullness.  These forms 
have been reduced by alteration to a kind of mean, since they can take on degrees of 
more and less, and this mean is the form appropriate to the mixed body which has come 
into existence. 
 However, Bobik37 states that Aquinas points out that these thinkers go further 
and argue that the substantial forms of the elements are of a most imperfect sort, since 
they are so close to prime matter, so close that nothing can be closer.  (This is contrary to 
the common opinion, Aquinas states, and to Aristotle in the Categories, that a substance 
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has no contraries, nor does it take on degrees of more and less).  From which they 
conclude that these substantial forms are in some sense midway, a kind of mean, between 
substantial forms generally and accidental forms.  They are less perfect than other 
substantial forms, and so can take on degrees of more and less, and have contraries.  But 
they are more perfect than accidental forms, and so can account for the existence of 
substances. 
 Bobik38says that Aquinas dismisses this position as unacceptable in many ways, 
for it is altogether impossible that there can be something midway, a mean, between 
substance and accident.  For in that case, there would be a mean between affirmation and 
negation, since it belongs to an accident to exist in a subject, and to a substance not to 
exist in a subject.  A thing either is, or is not, there is no in-between.  If there were, then 
there would be something which neither is nor is not.  There cannot be something which 
is, but is neither a substance nor an accident, nor can something be a substance up to a 
point, and simultaneously an accident up to a point.  If something exists, it is either a 
substance or an accident.  It cannot be, and not be either. 
 Substantial forms are in matter, but they are not in a subject, i.e. not in an actually 
existing subject.  For an actually existing subject is a substance – a hoc aliquid – some 
actual individual thing.  An accident presupposes the existence of a subject.  A substantial 
form, on the other hand, does not.  By way of significant difference, a substantial form is 
precisely what accounts for the existence of the subject.  Besides, the means and the 
extremes must belong to the same genus, as is proved in book ten of the Metaphysics.  If 
there were a mean between substance and accident, it would follow that substances, 
accidents and substantial forms, all three, would be substances, or that all three would be 
substantial forms.  All of which suppositions are unacceptable, and so to be rejected. 
 Bobik39 goes on to say that Aquinas states that it is impossible for the substantial 
forms of the elements to take on degrees of more and less.  For if they did, then both the 
generation and the corruption of the elements would be a motion which is a continuous 
one.  But this is impossible, because the generation and corruption of the elements are 
motions in the genus of substance.  Motion is continuous, Aquinas notes, if it is divisible, 
whether divisible per se or per accidens, as is clear in book six of the Physics.  Now, change in 
place, and increase and decrease in size, i.e. growth and its opposite, diminution, are 
motions which are divisible per se, since both place and quantity are divisible per se.  
Alteration, on the other hand, is a motion which is divisible per accidens, i.e. because of 
qualities which take on degrees of more and less, like hot and white.  So that, if the 
substantial forms of the elements were to change so as to take on degrees of more and 
less, the change would be a substantial change, and at the same time a motion which is 
divisible per accidens.  And so, the substantial forms of the elements would be undergoing 
a motion which is continuous, and which is in the genus of substance.  But this is 
impossible, because motion is continuous in three genera only, i.e. in quantity and quality 
and where, as is proved in book five of the Physics. 
 Moreover, Aquinas adds, every difference in substantial form varies, or changes, 
the species.  It is clear that what takes on degrees of more and less is different from what 
is less, and is in some way contrary to it.  For example, a thing A, which becomes even 
more white than something else, B, which was already less white than A; or a thing, A, 
which becomes less white than something else, B, which was previously less white than A.  
In both cases, A differs from B, and is in some way contrary to B.  So that, if the 
substantial form of fire, takes on degrees of more and less, then, whether it becomes 
more firey than it was, or less firey.  In either case it will not be the same form, but 
another.  That is, the more firey fire will not be fire, or, not fire of the same species.  The 
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less firey fire too, will not be fire, or, not fire of the same species.  For, in either case, 
there would have been a substantial change.  And this is what Aristotle had in mind when 
he wrote, in book eight of the Metaphysics, that just as numbers differ in species because 
of degrees of more, i.e. addition (of units), and degrees of less, i.e. subtraction (of units), 
so, too, do substances differ in species, but by the addition and subtraction of differences 
(rather than units). 
 Bobik offers no discussion on Averroës‟s argument.  This may simply be due to 
the difficulty of applying contemporary insights into the nature of the elements to 
construct a model in which the substantial forms of the elements might somehow be 
averaged out.  For example, just how the substantial forms of H2 and O2 might be made 
to form an average is not easy to visualise.  However, a second way of considering how 
two distinct substantial forms might combine, blend or mix to give a product a new 
substantial form, which could genuinely be regarded as their average, could be 
rationalised by examining the case of hybrids.  Although no mention of hybrids is made 
by Aristotle in his De Generatione et Corruptione, nevertheless the principles of animal 
hybridisation were well understood by ancient peoples, if for no other reason simply 
because of the breeding of mules. 
 A mule is sired by a donkey, with a horse as dam, and is bred specifically because 
it embodies useful characteristics, both asinine and equine in origin.  These characteristics 
include the strength and stamina of a horse, and the sure-footedness and manoeuvrability 
of a donkey.  This means that strength and stamina, obvious equine characteristics, are 
possessed of an animal not belonging to the species equus, and similarly, asinine 
characteristics of sure-footedness and manoeuvrability are possessed of an animal not 
belonging to the species asinus.  A mule is neither a horse nor a donkey, but somehow 
combines qualities of both species, and in appearance seems to resemble both of its 
parents.  The virtutes of a horse are present in an animal which is clearly not of the species 
equus, and those of a donkey are present in an animal not of the species asinus.  The 
species mulus exists in its own right, but with virtutes inherited from both its equine and 
asinine parents. 
 An Averroean might argue that the existence of hybrids could be taken as 
evidence that the substantial forms of two substances can be mixed or blended to give a 
new substance, distinct from, yet obviously related to both.  He might also argue that the 
principle of hybridisation demonstrates that when substances are hybridised some of the 
characteristics of each are transmitted in their entirety to the new substance.  He could 
also argue that a principle active in biological systems could have wider applications in 
nature, perhaps extending to the behaviour of the elements.  He could reason that the 
elements must somehow be present in the various substances found in the world, and, in 
addition, their accidental qualities must somehow be transferred to the new substances 
formed when those elements combine.  Hybridisation of the blending elements, 
combined with the conservation of some of the characteristics of each individual 
element, might provide a mechanism by which this could occur. 
 
3.3 Aquinas’s own Theory 
The elements remain with their powers and with retrievability, but not with their 
substantial forms. 
 Bobik40 says that Aquinas begins to give what he takes to be the proper answer to 
the question: how are elements in a mixed body?, an answer which will both: 
a. safeguard that the mixing is a true one, rather than to sense only, and 
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b. make certain that the elements have become, and remain, ingredients of the 
mixed body, and so have not been totally corrupted. 
 
 A true mixing requires that the elements have interacted and have changed one 
another in some way, but the change cannot be so radical as to have been their total 
corruption.  Still, the elements must have been corrupted – at least in some way – 
otherwise the mixed body could not have been generated.  Nonetheless, the elements 
must remain – at least in some way – otherwise the elements cannot be ingredients of the 
mixed body.  And so, the generation of a mixed body out of elements requires that these 
elements be both corrupted and not corrupted. 
 Bobik41 says that Aquinas begins by pointing out that it is the active and passive 
qualities of the elements, and not their substantial forms, which are contrary to one 
another, and take on degrees of more and less.  And one can add to this that the 
elements change, and are changed by, one another, precisely by means of, and with 
respect to, their active and passive qualities.  Thus, when the excellentia – the hottest, the 
coldest, the driest, the wettest – which is the proper degree of some elemental quality, 
meets with the most which is the proper degree of some other elemental quality, there 
results an interaction which tempers or diminishes both extremes, the result being some 
sort of more or less, some sort of in-between, mean quality.  Now, this mean quality is 
the proper or distinguishing quality of some mixed body, different mixed bodies having 
appropriately different mean qualities, some closer to one extreme, some closer to the 
other extreme.  And it is through this mean quality, as though the required proper 
disposition, that alteration, as the way to the generation of a mixed body, brings the mixed 
body into existence out of the required elements, mixed according to an appropriate 
proportion, just as it is through the extreme quality, as through the required proper 
disposition, that alteration, this time as the way to the corruption of a mixed body, 
retrieves, and thereby brings back into existence, the elements which had been the 
required ingredients of the now-corrupted mixed body. 
 Bobik42 says that Aquinas notes that the qualities of the simple bodies, i.e. of the 
elements, are found in the proper quality of a mixed body in a way which is similar to the 
way in which extremes are found in a mean which participates in the nature of each of 
them.  Bobik exemplifies this with water, hydrogen and oxygen (taking water as a mixed 
body, and hydrogen and oxygen as its elements).  One can say that the active and passive 
qualities of water are a mean of some sort, which participates in some way, in the 
extremes which are the active and passive qualities of hydrogen and oxygen.  And it is 
not at all necessary for this mean quality to be anything at all like either of the extreme 
qualities, and it may even turn out to be a surprise of some sort, even a complete surprise 
– oxygen supports burning, whereas water quenches it. 
 Bobik43 states that Aquinas comments on the relation between the qualities of the 
elements and their substantial forms.  He begins by emphasising the fact that the quality 
of a simple body, or element, is other than its substantial form.  Then he makes his main 
point, namely that the quality of an element acts under the influence, guidance (in virtute) 
of its substantial form.  In other words, the element acts as it does because of the 
qualities which it has, and the qualities which it has are due to its substantial form.  The 
substantial form of an element, once brought into existence, is not only continuously 
productive, and receptive, of the proper or distinguishing quality of that element, but 
performs its proper acts through that quality.  Otherwise, the heat of fire would do 
nothing but make things hot, and the substantial form of fire would not be brought to a 
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state of actuality through fire‟s heating action on a combustible material.  For nothing 
can produce that which is beyond its kind.  Fire produces fire, its own kind, through its 
proper quality or power, i.e. heat, but in virtute of its substantial form.  Neither, Bobik 
adds, would the substantial form of water, taking water to be a mixed body, be brought 
to a state of actuality via the interaction between the proper qualities of hydrogen and 
oxygen, unless this interaction took place in virtute of their substantial forms, as well as of 
the substantial forms of other things, to be discovered by careful investigation, which 
might be required to bring about the substantial change in which water is generated. 
 Bobik44 says that Aquinas concludes that it is in this way that the virtutes of the 
substantial forms of the simple bodies survive in mixed bodies.  But in what way?, since 
Aquinas does not make this explicit.  It seems that he is making a reference to his earlier 
statement that the qualities of simple bodies are found in the proper quality of a mixed 
body in a way which is much like the way in which extremes are found in a mean which 
participates to some extent in the nature of each of them.  Accepting this, one can say 
that the virtutes of the substantial forms of the elements survive in mixed bodies, but not 
the substantial forms themselves.  And so, the elements have been corrupted with 
respect to their substantial forms, but they have not  been corrupted with respect to their 
qualities.  These elemental qualities survive in the mixed body as tempered mean 
qualities. 
 Bobik45 gives as an example the case of hydrogen and oxygen becoming water, 
what is there, he says, is neither hydrogen nor oxygen, but water.  That is, hydrogen and 
oxygen are not there actually, though they are there potentially, and in two senses of 
„potentiality‟: 
i. virtually (by their power), and 
ii. retrievably. 
Water, nonetheless, does what water does, through its appropriate mean qualities, which 
are nothing but the now-tempered qualities of what were earlier, i.e. before the water 
came into existence, the „excelling‟ qualities of hydrogen and of oxygen, as separately 
existing entities.  It is the now-tempered (formerly excelling) qualities which actually 
survive, and actually remain, in the mixed body, and now under the influence or 
guidance, in virtute, of the substantial form of that mixed body. 
 According to Bobik46 Aquinas gives a summary of how elements are in a mixed 
body.  They survive, and are there, not by reason of their substantial forms, but by reason 
of their powers, i.e. qualities.  The forms of elements are in mixed bodies not actually, 
but virtually (by their power).  None of the elements is completely corrupted, neither is 
any of them completely preserved.  As Aristotle puts it: „What is preserved is their 
power.‟47  And their power, precisely because it is preserved, is retrievable.  So are their 
substantial forms retrievable, and again via their power, functioning as the appropriate 
disposition?  Thus, the substantial forms of the elements are not actually present in 
mixed bodies.  Each mixed body has its own, single, substantial form, and it is this 
substantial form which manifests its proper activities through its proper qualities, which 
had been the extreme, or excelling, qualities now brought, or tempered, to a mean, of the 
formerly separately existing elements.  The mixed body, like any corporeal substance, can 
have actually but one substantial form, its own.  Potentially, however, i.e. both virtually, in 
their power, and retrievably, it has as many substantial forms, in number and in kind, as 
the elements which are required as its ingredients. 
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 On considering the three arguments presented by Aquinas, it could be argued 
that he himself gave the account of how elements are present in compounds most easily 
reconciled with contemporary scientific understanding of the matter.  In his analysis of 
the question under consideration he is anxious to state that the elements in combination 
are not totally corrupted (non totaliter corrumpantur) but remain in some way in the blend.  
In addition, the qualities (virtutes) of the substantial forms of the simple bodies are 
preserved in the blend. 
 Continuing with Bobik‟s example of water, composed of the elements hydrogen 
and oxygen, and taking elemental hydrogen as consisting of two hydrogen atoms in 
combination to form a hydrogen molecule, and similarly elemental oxygen as two atoms 
of oxygen combined with each other to form an oxygen molecule, one could say that a 
molecule of the element hydrogen is split or „corrupted‟ into its two constituent atoms, 
and that these atoms combine with an atom of oxygen, likewise formed from the 
splitting or „corrupting‟ of a molecule of oxygen, to form a molecule of water.  Of course 
the „corrupting‟ of hydrogen and oxygen molecules, understood in this way, really refers 
to the splitting of these molecules into atoms, which then react together to form 
molecules of water.  When the molecules of hydrogen and oxygen split and then reacted 
to form water, a genuine compound was formed, water, ensuring Aquinas‟s requirement 
of the preservation of the truth of the blend (veritas mixtionis salvetur) and also his 
requirement that the elements are not totally corrupted (non totaliter corrumpantur), as 
elemental hydrogen and oxygen simply change from their molecular- to their atomic-
state, and retain their properties as hydrogen and oxygen. 
 In addition, Aquinas posited that the specific properties of the constituent 
elements of a compound would be averaged out (or to give his own example, sicut 
pallidum inter album et nigrum) as between the two elements.  And this is borne out, for 
example, in the case of water, of which the molecular weight (18) is simply equal to the 
atomic weight of an oxygen atom (16) added to that of two atoms of hydrogen (2). 
 His insistence that the virtues of the substantial form (virtutes formarum) be 
preserved in the blended bodies holds true for water, as both elemental hydrogen and 
oxygen can be reconstituted from water – demonstrating that their „corruption‟ is indeed 
reversible.  And a point made by Aristotle48 though not alluded to either by Aquinas or 
Bobik, is also fulfilled in the case of water.  For when Aristotle says that 'things that are 
mixed manifestly come together from having formerly been separate, and are capable of 
being separated again' he may have been referring to the fact that whatever 
transformations elements undergo in forming compounds can be reversed in some way, 
so that the original elements can be reconstituted from their compounds.  Presumably 
Aristotle believed that the elements reconstituted in this way would retain their special 
active and passive qualities. 
 In considering Aquinas‟s analysis of how elements are present in compounds, it is 
possible to attempt an understanding of the problem in terms of the medieval concepts 
of how the elements are constituted and behave, but it is also possible to understand the 
matter in terms of the insights brought to bear on the matter by modern scientific theory.  
Of the three arguments presented by Aquinas, his own seems best to accord with 
contemporary insights on the nature and behaviour of the elements.  Why this should be 
may simply be due to his ability as a logical thinker to think the problem through, and to 
realise that if the elements were to form a true compound (mixtio secundum veritatem) the 
elements themselves would have to change or transform in some way so as to allow their 
true combining.  But their specific properties would somehow have to average out with 
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those of the other elements in order to permit the formation of a compound having 
properties influenced by each of its constituent elements. 
 
 
 
 
IV 
Conclusion 
 
At the centre of the subject under discussion by Aquinas is the question of taking 
elements, each with its own nature and active and passive qualities, and creating a logical 
system which could account for the way in which these elements might combine with 
one another, but in such a way that they did not violate the rules of how substances 
behave, as laid down by Aristotle.  This question imposes real demands on the thinker as 
the elements are substances and have forms.  As well as having active and passive 
qualities, they may exist actually or potentially.  If these elements are to combine so as to 
give a true mixing (vera mixtio) and not just a mixing to sense (mixtio ad sensum) surely they 
will have to change somehow in order to fulfil this requirement?, and do this without 
losing their identities as substances, or remitting their qualities.  But how can they do so 
without losing their identities as substances, or compromising their properties in some 
way?  Avicenna, Averroës and Aquinas all attempted to deal with the question and offer a 
satisfactory account of this matter.   
 Aquinas skilfully employs arguments put forward by Aristotle to disprove the 
theories of Avicenna and Averroës and to validate his own theory.  Maier49 says that in 
his analysis Aquinas offers a „tertio opinio‟ which stands beside those of Averroës and 
Avicenna, and together with which provided the point of departure (Ausgangspunkt) for 
the discussion of the problem in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 
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